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1All people who migrate have the pros-
pect of going back to where they came 
from sooner or later. Whether or not 
they do, the possibility of return sets 
migrants apart from those who never 
left. 
This report examines the im-
plications of that distinction. With 
a wide-angle lens, we view return 
migration in the form of refugee 
repatriation, deportation, retirement 
return, temporary return and other 
scenarios of moving back to one’s 
country of origin. 
Return migration has many faces: 
for some it is a dream, for others, a 
threat, and still others, a duty.
Realities and possibilities
Return migration is a phenomenon 
that pervades life in two significant 
ways. First, the reality is that many 
migrants do go back. In Norway, 
where much of our research is based, 
half of all immigrants leave within ten 
years of their arrival, many return-
ing to their country of origin. The 
realities of return migration concern 
who returns, how they experience it 
and what impact their return has on 
others.
Second, all migrants can relate to 
the possibility of return. For many, it 
touches on deeper existential issues. 
Considerations about return are 
perhaps most pressing for individuals 
who actively plan, wish for or fear 
its realization in the near future. But 
even among those who see return 
only as a distant prospect—as well 
as those who have decided against 
it—the question of return is closely 
linked to feelings of belonging and 
identity.
Scholars sometimes study return 
intentions in hopes of predicting 
migration behaviour. In this situation, 
it can be frustrating that many mi-
grants say they will return but end up 
staying. Our view, by contrast, is that 
engagement with the possibility of 
return can shape people’s relationship 
with the society in which they live and 
the ties they maintain to their country 
of origin, regardless of whether they 
eventually go back.
In transnational social fields, the 
realities of return for some individuals 
are connected to the possibilities of re-
turn for others. Returnees share their 
experiences with friends and family 
who remain abroad, thus shaping im-
aginations and decisions about return 
in diaspora communities.
What is return migration?
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2Force and choice
The traditional distinction between 
‘forced’ and ‘voluntary’ migration 
is increasinglybeing abandoned for 
more nuanced understandings of 
choices and constraints. For instance, 
researchers acknowledge that people 
in situations of extreme insecurity 
exercise judgement and execute 
decisions about whether, when and 
how to migrate. At the same time, 
contemporary return migration is 
at times ‘forced’ in a brutally literal 
sense: deportees can be detained and 
physically transported to another 
country against their will. 
Return migration, however, can 
also be a smooth experience in bu-
reaucratic terms for those who desire 
it. Migrants who hold their original 
citizenship can repatriate on short 
notice without all the paperwork that 
may have accompanied their initial 
migration.
Despite such clear-cut divides, 
return migration plays out along an 
intricate spectrum of agency, oppor-
tunity and coercion. Asylum seekers 
whose applications are rejected have 
few options, but still they must make 
strategic choices: whether to sign up 
for assisted return, whether to keep 
pursuing appeals and how to man-
age relations with one’s family in the 
country of origin, to name a few. 
Labour migrants and their family 
members who are legally free to stay 
or to return may nevertheless face 
constraints that are largely invisible to 
outsiders. For some intra-European 
migrants, for instance, the blessing 
of free mobility actually becomes a 
curse; they feel imprisoned by the 
economic needs that compel them to 
remain mobile. Other invisible forms 
of coercion emerge in the family 
sphere. Children and spouses in 
some cases return to their country of 
origin against their will, though their 
migration differs fundamentally from 
what is generally considered ‘forced 
return’.
It has been a point of confusion 
and contention that programmes 
for ‘voluntary assisted return’ target 
Policy Point Academics and policymakers may have differing vocabu-
laries to describe conceptual frameworks. We use ‘return’ as shorthand for 
‘return migration’, referring to all relocations of migrants back to the coun-
try of origin. This includes deportation, removal and assisted return, as well 
as return on an individual’s own initiative. Policymakers usually use ‘return’ 
to mean specifically the return of individuals lacking the legal right to stay. 
Variations in labelling are not only about vocabulary, but also about how we 
make sense of a complex reality. Academics can provide perspectives that 
complement a logic shaped by policy objectives.
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3individuals who do not wish to return, 
primarily rejected asylum seekers. 
Norwegian authorities have made 
an innovative and sensible move by 
dropping the word ‘voluntary’, now 
referring to ‘assisted return’. While 
migration policy has profound in-
fluence on the opportunities and the 
limitations migrants face, there is no 
straightforward correlation between 
administrative categories, their 
names, and the scope for agency. 
The myths of return
Most international migrants move 
with an intention to return to their 
country of origin, though actual re-
turn typically occurs at a much lower 
rate. The ‘myth of return’, as it is 
known, has been an established con-
cept in the study of migration for the 
past three decades. It emerged from 
a pattern that was prominent in post-
war labour migration to North-West-
ern Europe, and holds true in other 
contexts, too. 
This, however, encompasses more 
than demographic patterns. The myth 
of return embodies the psychological, 
cultural and political processes 
through which migrants sustain 
the idea of a future return even as it 
becomes increasingly unlikely.
It is unsurprising that many 
migrants remain in their country of 
settlement even if their intention had 
been to return; they establish new 
attachments and identities, and the 
social environments that migrants left 
behind might have changed dramat-
ically in their absence. Understand-
ing the myth of return necessitates 
understanding why so many migrants 
are reluctant to rule out return.
This well-established notion is 
accompanied by a second myth of 
return: the idea of ‘return migration’ 
as a clear-cut concept. The notion of 
migrants moving back to where they 
came from appears straight-forward, 
but gets undermined from several 
directions. Going against the logic of 
living in one place, some migrants 
are more fluidly mobile. Others have 
moved back and forth several times, 
having established a firm foothold in 
both countries, and do not see a move 
in one particular direction as ‘return’. 
Still others do return to their coun-
try of origin after living many years 
abroad, but settle in urban environ-
ments that are new and unfamiliar, 
thus defying the literal understanding 
of coming ‘back’.
There is a major discrepancy 
between the conceptual simplicity of 
return migration and its real-life com-
plexities. Although a stumbling block 
for policy formation, this gap is an 
inspiring starting point for scientific 
research.
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5How to read this report
The research project Possibilities and Realities of Return Migration (PREMIG) 
has resulted in over 50 scientific publications, completed or in the works, 
written with a range of themes, perspectives and audiences in mind. 
This report highlights points that have particularly fascinated us, sampling 
from a field of diverse insights. 
We zoom in on particular issues and cases, and we zoom out to invoke 
the big themes that inspired the project and cut across the ensuing 
journal articles, book chapters and policy briefs. Since we have aimed to 
cover a lot of ground, the observations we make do not offer the same 
level of technicality or detail as is found in our other publications. This 
report can nevertheless be used and cited as a stand-alone document.
An enumerated list of publications begins on page 44. The numbers 
correspond to the superscript numbers we give throughout the publi-
cation to refer readers to sources of documentation or elaboration. The 
points in this report are not, however, simply lifted from the references; 
our accumulated experience from the project and its publications has 
allowed us to formulate additional new insights that are being published 
here for the first time.
Suggested citation: Carling, Jørgen, Marta Bolognani, Marta Bivand Erdal, Rojan Tordhol 
Ezzati, Ceri Oeppen, Erlend Paasche, Silje Vatne Pettersen and Tove Heggli Sagmo (2015) 
Possibilities and Realities of Return Migration. Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo.
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6Project design
PREMIG set out to explore the follow-
ing broad questions: 
1. How do immigrants in various 
situations reflect on and decide 
about return migration?
2. How does the possibility of return 
interact with their (a) integration 
in the country of residence and 
(b) transnational relationships? 
3. How can we understand and ex-
plain the patterns of actual return 
among immigrants? 
4. How is return migration experi-
enced by return migrants and the 
communities to which they return? 
A thorough literature review conducted 
in the first year of the project ensured 
that our efforts would build upon the 
work of others and make valuable 
contributions to existing research.12, 15
Our studies analysed return 
migration from two countries: 
Norway and the United Kingdom. 
The bulk of data collection consisted 
of five ethnographic case studies 
that examined return migration to 
Afghanistan, Burundi, Iraqi Kurdis-
tan, Pakistan and Poland. We selected 
these countries in order to work with 
diverse circumstances: return migra-
tion within and out of Europe, among 
labour migrants and refugees, in 
large and small migrant populations 
and to countries with various degrees 
of insecurity and prosperity. 
The five case studies were based 
on data collection through fieldwork 
in Norway, the UK and the country of 
origin. In Norway, we also conducted 
a sixth case study referred to as the 
super-diversity case. This sample of 
migrants from diverse origins helped 
us see beyond the influence of par-
ticular national backgrounds.36
The design aimed for 15 semi-
structured interviews and four focus 
groups for each case in each country, 
or 240 interviews and 64 focus groups 
in total. We exceeded the target for 
interviewees in half the settings, and 
interviewed a hundred individuals 
more than originally planned. Focus 
groups, by contrast, proved unexpect-
edly demanding to organize, often for 
purely logistical reasons. We com-
pleted 51, which was slightly below 
the target. In total, the qualitative 
data collection encompassed face-to-
face interaction with 596 individuals 
through interviews or focus groups.
The Norwegian component of 
the project also made use of existing 
statistical data. A survey of living 
conditions among more than 3000 
immigrants in Norway allowed us to 
analyse patterns in return migration 
intentions.17, 18 Population register 
data were used to examine determi-
nants of actual out-migration among 
immigrants in Norway.52
Return migration is a field rife 
with conflicting interests. We were 
therefore cautious about endorsing 
specific policy objectives. Instead, we 
sought to bring out diverse perspec-
tives and contribute to a better un-
derstanding of how return is thought 
about, under what conditions it takes 
place, and how it is experienced.
Project funding
PREMIG was funded by the Research Council of Norway’s research pro gram me 
Welfare, Working Life and Migration (VAM). One of the programme’s objec-
tives is to promote analyses that link together areas traditionally separated 
by institutional and sectoral divides. 
7Fieldwork locations 
and migration flows 
examined through 
case studies
The Norwegian survey data on return 
migration intentions covered immigrants 
from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, 
Montenegro, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, 
Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Somalia and Chile.
8Leading a large-scale project
PREMIG is a large-scale endeavour, being two to 
three times the size of typical research projects fund-
ed by The Research Council of Norway. 
I believe we have succeeded in collecting rich and ex-
tensive data, generating new insights about return mi-
gration, and engaging with relevant user groups. One 
sign of success is that the project’s publication record 
far exceeds our original commitments. Still, there are 
always lessons to take away. 
Looking back, I see two areas in which we have not 
yet made full use of the project’s potential. First, the 
qualitative and quantitative components could have 
been more closely integrated. So far, none of our 
publications draws substantially on both. Having said 
that, working on a team that uses both methodolo-
gies strengthened each component. Second, I believe 
we could do more comparative analysis across the 
case studies. At present, we do have publications that 
draw on multiple cases, and this report makes gen-
eral observations across them. However, we wish to 
exploit our data further in this respect. 
An integral part of our learning experience was 
about project management itself. Leading a large-
scale research project is a balancing act between, on 
the one hand, streamlining and coordinating the re-
search, and, on the other hand, encouraging internal 
diversity and individual ownership. The latter is crucial 
because it helps develop careers and because the 
project’s success fndamentally depends on individu-
als’ creativity and devotion.
Our project relied heavily on electronic collaboration 
between team members in different locations, some-
times by pioneering the adoption of new solutions. 
For qualitative data analysis, we used NVivo Server, a 
version of the well-established software that allows 
for simultaneous analysis by multiple users. For com-
piling findings from across the project, we developed 
a customized interface in Microsoft SharePoint. We 
Data collection, Norway and the UK
Data collection,  
countries of origin
Survey data analysis
Analysis and writing
Register data analysis
Coding qualitative dataLiterature review
Concluding  
conference
Opening  
conference
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9also pioneered the use of web-based newsletter 
management at PRIO.
In all these areas, the benefits were mixed with chal-
lenges. Too often, researchers who were working un-
der pressure and wanted to focus on content were 
obstructed by technological hurdles beyond their 
control. Even when new systems worked as intend-
ed, it became clear that they might only benefit re-
searchers if used frequently.
Whilst electronic interaction is useful, we also bene-
fitted tremendously from having regular face-to-face 
meetings. In the early stages, these intensive two-day 
project workshops were essential for collectively de-
fining interview questions and analysis tools. In later 
stages, they provided a forum for sharing analytical 
ideas and draft outputs. The workshops also offered 
opportunities to build a strong, supportive interna-
tional network of researchers who will no doubt 
continue to collaborate across their shared interests.
The scope of PREMIG allowed us to do more re-
search than an average project would afford. But it 
also heightened the quality of research. Our critical 
mass of resources afforded investments in research 
communication, for instance, and the flexibility to 
pursue new leads along the way.
The eight researchers comprising the core group 
were able to spend, on average, about one third of 
their working time on PREMIG over the project’s 
lifespan. This level of cooperation encouraged us to 
learn from each other in ways far more profound 
than we have experienced in smaller projects.
Jørgen Carling 
Project leader
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10
From across the case studies and statistical analyses, we 
have made ten general observations. Over the following 
pages we add substance and nuance to each one.
1. Return intentions are shaped by 
multiple attachments
2. Return migration is not simply a 
personal issue
3. Potential returnees grapple with 
uncertainties and distrust
4. A secure status abroad creates 
opportunities for return
5. Return migration is an engagement 
with time as well as with place
6. Return migration creates intersections 
of the social and the economic
7. Gender relations affect return 
migration in contradictory ways
8. Return visits play a crucial role in 
migration trajectories
9. Return experiences are shaped by 
more than tangible outcomes
10. Reintegration can be as challenging 
as integration
Selected findings
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1. Return intentions are shaped by  
multiple attachments
Considerations about returning or not are shaped by multiple and sometimes 
competing attachments to people, communities, and countries. The balance 
of attachment is particularly important. But it can be challenging to draw 
comparisons when attachments concern different spheres of life.
 ▪ Considerations about return 
reflect attachments in diverse 
spheres of life. The different ele-
ments cannot neatly be summed 
up to reach a verdict on what is 
best ‘all things considered’. For 
many, return is laden with exis-
tential meaning; returning or not 
has to do with livelihoods, family, 
identity, ambitions, ideology. For 
some, issues of risk and security 
are also prominent.5, 23, 41
 ▪ Emigration challenges ideas about 
home, belonging and identity in 
ways that can be quite painful.40, 41 
Migrants’ considerations about 
return are typically ambivalent. 
They change over time and often 
have little to do with actual return 
plans. Rather, they have more to 
do with negotiations of belong-
ing in the transnational social 
field, and in relation to multiple 
societies.23
 ▪ The discursive possibility of 
return—the idea that ‘going back’ 
is possible—affects experiences of 
belonging, inclusion, and exclu-
sion. A feeling of alienation in 
the destination society can keep 
the possibility of return alive. But 
alienation can also be promoted by 
anti-immigrant rhetoric calling for 
immigrants to ‘go back to where 
they came from’.9
 ▪ Integration in the country of 
settlement and transnational ties 
to the country of origin both affect 
return intentions. Specifically, re-
turn intentions are shaped by the 
relative strength of integration 
and transnationalism. The highest 
likelihood of return intentions is 
found among individuals who are 
both weakly integrated and strong-
ly transnational.17
 ▪ Integration and transnationalism 
can cancel each other out and 
produce intermediate odds of 
intending to return. This is the 
case with individuals who are both 
strongly integrated and strongly 
transnational as well as those who 
are neither strongly integrated nor 
strongly transnational. These two 
POLICY POINT  A popular assumption in policy debates is that 
stronger immigrant integration implies weaker ties to the country of origin, 
and vice versa. Recent social-scientific research increasingly challenges this 
assumption on both theoretical and empirical grounds, showing that inte-
gration in the country of settlement can coexist perfectly well with strong 
transnational attachments to the country of origin.17, 18, 21, 23
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groups have strikingly similar like-
lihoods of return intentions.17 
 ▪ Transnational ties to the country 
of origin are important for making 
decisions about return as well as for 
ensuring reintegration. For some 
migrants, however, transnational 
ties are motivated in part by the 
impossibility or undesirability 
of return. When moving back 
is not an option, active transna-
tionalism becomes all the more 
important for maintaining a sense 
of belonging and passing it on to 
the next generation.
 ▪ Many children of immigrants 
in Norway express a wish to move 
to their parents’ country of origin. 
According to survey data, 22 per 
cent of people who were born in 
Norway or spent at least some of 
their childhood in the country 
intend to return, compared to 
26 per cent among those who 
immigrated as adults.17 Our qual-
itative interviews with children of 
immigrants further nuanced the 
picture: many wished to spend 
some time in their parents’ coun-
try of origin, though hardly any 
expressed the desire for perma-
nent return.33
 ▪ For Afghans and Pakistanis,  
notions of freedom and the 
relative liberties of Europe were 
important for considerations about 
return. Besides the more obvious 
freedoms related to human secu-
rity, it was clear that day-to-day 
freedom from social control was 
important. For youth, especially, 
not being closely monitored by rel-
atives was an appreciated freedom, 
even though many missed their 
family.9
 ▪ Religiosity has a significant effect 
on return intentions. Survey data 
showed that immigrants in Nor-
way who regard religion as ‘very 
important’ in their lives are more 
likely to intend to return to their 
country of origin. This pattern 
Changing perspectives on return among British Pakistanis
Research among second- and third-generation British Pakistanis in 2002–
2003 showed that the idea of return served as a rhetorical device for 
symbolically and politically negotiating a place in British society. The under-
lying argument was that if the UK did not want them anymore, notably 
in the wake of 9/11 and extensive riots in northern England, they would 
move to Pakistan. By a decade later, however, the argument of going ‘home’ 
had progressively disappeared. Relations between the UK as a state and 
Pakistanis as an ethnic group may have not improved on many counts, but 
Pakistan has become a much more difficult place to think of as an oasis.5, 9
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could reflect greater possibilities 
for letting one’s faith shape daily 
life in the country of origin, or it 
could reflect a more diffuse orien-
tation towards traditional values 
that correlate with religiosity.17
 ▪ Fieldwork among British Pakistan-
is revealed more complex con-
nections between Islamic identity 
and considerations about return. 
A common inferiority complex 
linked to village origins dismisses 
such orientations as backward; 
adopting an internationally 
oriented Islamic identity counter-
balances this shame. This form 
of Islamic identity and practice is 
perceived to be more compatible 
with life in the UK than life in 
Pakistan.4, 5
 ▪ Different destination countries 
can represent different forms of 
labour market attachment. 
For Polish migrants, the UK and 
Norway seem to offer distinct soci-
oeconomic opportunity structures: 
many young and highly educated 
individuals have found work in the 
UK, while a greater proportion of 
skilled professionals entered the 
Norwegian labour market. Highly 
skilled Poles are more likely to 
speak English, and may see great-
er opportunities for developing 
careers in the UK.35
 ▪ Dreams about return—even to 
societies in turmoil—can be 
sustained by uncertainties and 
hardships in the destination so-
ciety. Young Afghans precariously 
situated in the asylum system 
expressed hopes that life would be 
better in Afghanistan.
 ▪ Considerations about return mi-
gration are affected by migrants’ 
citizenship status not only in the 
country of settlement, but also in 
the country of origin. Increasingly, 
emigration states are developing 
policies to target their emigrated 
populations. It makes a difference 
to these efforts whether or not mi-
grants can retain their original citi-
zenship if they acquire citizenship 
in the country of settlement.24, 25
The matrix of attachment
Migrants have weak and strong 
attachments to both their coun-
try of residence and country of 
origin. Strong attachments to 
where they live are a manifes-
tation of integration. Conversely, 
strong attachments to the coun-
try of origin are expressions of 
transnationalism. 
In our analysis of return migra-
tion intentions, we developed a 
simple conceptual framework for 
studying the intersection of the 
two dimensions. In a simple but 
effective way, the matrix high-
lights the four different possible 
combinations of integration and 
transnationalism. It reflects the 
argument that integration and 
transnationalism are neither cor-
related in a predetermined way 
nor independent of each other.17, 18
POLICY POINT Migrants’ engagement with their countries of origin 
can encompass mixed contributions to armed conflict, peace-building, and 
development. In Norway, migrants’ promotion of peace and prosperity in 
their countries of origin is important to their experiences of being seen 
and heard within Norway. Moreover, their efforts partly overlap with the 
Norwegian government’s international agendas. This dual reality links the 
policy areas of immigrant integration and foreign affairs, though would ben-
efit from better coordination between ministries and other governmental 
institutions.31
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2. Return migration is not simply  
a personal issue
Decisions about return migration are complicated because they have implications 
for other people. Not only are family members affected; return decisions are made 
in social and political contexts where they can be seen as statements of identity or 
allegiance, and they affect the life choices of others.
 ▪ For migrants who have left 
relatives behind in the country 
of origin, family considerations 
often exert conflicting pressures 
on the idea of return. On the one 
hand, the prospect of uniting 
the family is a strong incentive 
for return. On the other hand, 
the family’s needs are a push to 
remain abroad so as to continue 
earning the money that secures 
their quality of life.22, 37
 ▪ Afghans who did not succeed in 
obtaining asylum in Europe were 
sometimes open to returning to 
Afghanistan. However, they were 
frequently advised by family 
members in Afghanistan not to 
do so, even if they did not have a 
legal residency status in Europe. 
 ▪ Living abroad in what are rela-
tively individualistic societies can 
change attitudes towards privacy 
and individual freedom. Afghans 
in Europe feared that the loss of 
privacy and independence would 
be a challenging aspect of re-
turning to Afghanistan. Among 
returnees, the same issue was 
brought up as a difficult aspect of 
reintegration.43, 56
 ▪ When immigrant integration 
affects reflections about return, 
it is not necessarily the migrants’ 
individual integration that matters 
most, but that of their children. 
If they are of school age, this is 
often a major factor shaping the 
possibility of return.30, 33, 50
 ▪ Some Iraqi Kurds in Europe saw 
return to Kurdistan to be par-
ticularly challenging for young 
women and girls. Return and re-
integration was therefore thought 
to be easier for girls if it happened 
before they reached puberty. For 
socially conservative families, es-
pecially, the age of a family’s eldest 
daughter has great importance for 
the timing of return.50
 ▪ Among immigrants in Norway, 
having family in the country 
is a strong predictor of staying, 
rather than returning or migrat-
ing elsewhere. This was evident 
from analysis of actual migration 
patterns, and it held true for male 
and female immigrants alike.52
 ▪ Immigrants who were admitted 
to Norway on the basis of family 
ties are significantly more likely to 
have return intentions than those 
who entered as workers, students 
or refugees. Among the groups 
included in the survey data, family 
ties were usually with other immi-
grants, not native Norwegians.17
 ▪ Possibilities for short-term return 
can depend on family in the 
country of origin. Young Af-
ghans, both male and female, 
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who held European passports were 
often keen to spend time in Afgha-
ni stan, for instance, doing work for 
non-governmental organizations. 
However, their parent typically only 
supported the idea if there were 
family members in Afghani stan 
who could keep an eye on them.
 ▪ Denying the possibility of return 
is a central component to asylum 
claims. If other migrants from the 
same country are in fact returning, 
asylum seekers may fear that their 
claims about fear of persecution 
will be undermined.40, 41
 ▪ The question of returning or not 
sometimes gets charged with a 
political or ideological dimen-
sion. This may occur whether 
return is a free choice or it involves 
resisting deportation. Among Zim-
babweans in the UK and Burun-
dians and Ethiopians in Norway, 
the question of return was embed-
ded in divided opinions within the 
diaspora. Regarding return as ei-
ther feasible or not was the equiv-
alent of making politically charged 
statements about the situation in 
the country of origin.20, 40, 41, 47, 53
 ▪ Political discourses within 
societies of destination can affect 
immigrants’ thoughts and feelings 
about return migration. The con-
sequences for actual return might 
be marginal, but the possibility of 
return is kept alive. In particular, 
we found that public discourses 
on immigration control and on 
immigrant integration and social 
cohesion affected migrants’ sense 
of belonging and feelings about 
return.9
Not simply insider or outsider
Our research led to several new insights on methodology. One that we 
decided to pursue and document dealt with the relationship between 
researchers and the people with whom they do research. In migration 
research it is common to distinguish between ‘insider’ researchers who 
are part of the migrant group under study and ‘outsider’ researchers who 
belong to the majority population. We used our experiences with PREMIG 
fieldwork, coupled with our previous research, to develop a more nuanced 
approach to the identities of researchers and research subjects in relation 
to each other. We examined how a range of visible and invisible markers 
– including gender, parenthood and religion – are at work in processes of 
establishing multifaceted relational positions. Greater awareness of such 
processes can strengthen research methodology and avert reproduction 
of stereotypical ‘us versus them’ logic. Now used in research methodology 
courses is the article in which we presented the analysis, ‘Beyond the in-
sider-outsider divide in migration research’ published in Migration Studies.14
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3. Potential returnees grapple with  
uncertainties and distrust
The future is always uncertain, and a future in a different place, even more so. 
Information to help anticipate the outcome of return migration is often scarce, 
untrustworthy or biased. Individuals who contemplate return can have a hard 
time knowing what to believe and whom to trust.
 ▪ Potential returnees rely primarily 
on family and friends for infor-
mation about conditions in the 
country of origin. They commu-
nicate with people who remain in 
the country of origin, returnees, 
and other migrants who have 
recently visited and can share 
updated impressions.2, 25
 ▪ Social media plays an important 
role in spreading impressions 
about life in the country of origin.2 
Among Afghans, for instance, 
Facebook was regularly used for 
sharing photos of visits to Af-
ghanistan and news stories about 
events there. Private channels, 
including free communication 
services such as Skype and Viber, 
were used to discuss the local 
situation with family.
 ▪ Notably in refugee diasporas, opti-
mistic or pessimistic portrayals 
of developments in the country 
of origin often reflect political 
positions. Among Burundians 
and Zimbabweans, for instance, 
sharply contrasting discourses 
were couched in optimistic and 
pessimistic terms. Narratives from 
return visits were used to support 
one of the two positions. 41, 53
 ▪ When it is difficult to decide what 
to believe about conditions in the 
country of origin, a large and di-
verse social network is valuable. 
The Burundian case exemplified 
how a cultural tradition of oral 
communication, combined with the 
uncertainties of armed conflict, in-
duced potential returnees to trian-
gulate information from separate 
sources before acting upon it.54
 ▪ A history of armed conflict 
introduces particular uncertainties 
about a country’s future. In the 
case of Iraqi Kurdistan, a booming 
economy attracted considerable 
return migration at the time 
of fieldwork in 2012–2013, but 
some emigrants remained abroad 
specifically because they feared 
future armed conflict. Their fears 
were justified, as war broke out 
in 2014.50 Similarly, Burundian 
migrants’ concerns about the 
possible re-eruption of violence 
proved valid.
POLICY POINT Pakistan’s strategies for engaging with the diaspora 
are hampered by inherent distrust of the state among many Pakistanis 
abroad. Policies that target transnational practices with minimal govern-
ment involvement, such as the Pakistan Remittance Initiative, are better 
positioned for success.25
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 ▪ While many migrants maintain a 
strong sense of national pride and 
identity, they often distrust the 
government of their countries 
of origin. This is not necessarily 
caused by political differences 
or conflicting ideologies, but by 
profound misgivings about the 
political system, its institutions, 
and the people who hold positions, 
as well as distrust in the govern-
ment’s ability to support those in 
need.10, 25,42, 47, 48
 ▪ Many countries of origin have 
launched government cam-
paigns to engage with diaspora 
populations and, in some cases, 
to encourage return. Even where 
there are state-run websites and 
other information resources 
about return migration, such as 
in Pakistan and Poland, potential 
returnees seem inclined to obtain 
information elsewhere.25
 ▪ Whether or not to move back to 
one’s country of origin is a high-
stakes decision with substantial 
uncertainty. Consequently, the 
ground is fertile for rumour. Ana-
lysing rumours provides insights 
into the information gaps, hypoth-
eses, collective sense-making and 
conflicting truth claims that affect 
migration processes.19
POLICY POINT The often lengthy asylum process—sometimes 
including spells in detention and threats of deportation—has been con-
ducive to a negative experience for asylum seekers as they engage with 
institutions and officials concerning their immigration status. They have lit-
tle reason to trust such parties, usually because they themselves are the 
object of distrust. Their cases are regularly referred to as ‘stories’ and they 
must prove a well-founded fear of persecution in a culture of disbelief. It 
is unsurprising, then, that Afghan research participants expressed distrust 
of the advice and help offered through assisted return programmes. Many 
doubted, rightly or not, that they would receive the in-country assistance 
promised upon return. This was accentuated by transnational communi-
cations from previous returnees about delays, among other difficulties, in 
accessing assistance once back in Afghanistan.
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4. A secure status abroad creates  
opportunities for return
The uncertainty of return migration makes irrevocable return an intimidating 
prospect. Having the possibility to reconsider makes return much more appealing. 
For this reason, the ultimate form of structural integration in the destination—
acquiring citizenship—can facilitate return to the country of origin.
 ▪ Decisions about return migration 
are fundamentally affected by 
whether or not return is reversible. 
Citizenship in the country of des-
tination best guarantees a possible 
way out of an unsuccessful return. 
People who stand to lose their 
right to live in Europe may rule 
out return— even if they are oth-
erwise inclined to do so—because 
the stakes are too high.5, 24, 30, 40
 ▪ The dynamics of intra-European 
return migration are fundamen-
tally different from those of return 
migration from Europe to other 
parts of the world. Provisions for 
free mobility make return more 
easily reversible. However, the le-
gal freedom is often coupled with 
economic or social constraints that 
increase the threshold for attempt-
ing to return.10, 22
 ▪ Restrictions on dual citizenship 
can complicate return migration. 
Citizenship abroad makes it easier 
to attempt return migration since 
an exit option remains intact, 
provided the individual has dual 
citizenship. But if migrants must 
give up their original citizenship, 
they may lose rights that could 
otherwise facilitate return and 
reintegration. Some countries of 
origin issue documents to emi-
grants to help prevent these obsta-
cles. For instance, many Norwe-
gian Pakistanis hold a Norwegian 
passport and a National Identity 
Card for Overseas Pakistanis. This 
document grants visa-free travel 
and the right to own property in 
Pakistan but not to vote.25
 ▪ For Iraqi Kurds with dual citizen-
ship, holding a foreign passport 
was a mixed blessing. It was 
instrumental as an insurance 
mechanism, but it was also used 
against them, being mentioned 
by non-migrants as a marker of 
difference. Negotiating member-
ship upon return can be difficult 
as a returnee and a ‘foreigner’. At 
the same time, holding a foreign 
passport is not uncommon among 
the ruling elites.
POLICY POINT Dual citizenship allows for formal and legal ties to 
accompany social, cultural or familial attachments to two countries. Such 
ties may be important in providing opportunities for sustained mobility 
and transnational living, or testing the ground for what may become more 
permanent return migration. 
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5. Return migration is an engagement  
with time as well as with place
Migrants’ thoughts about possible return migration are shaped by the temporal 
dimensions of their own lives, especially concerning migration histories and life 
stages. Moreover, return migration is about shaping one’s future and re-engaging 
with one’s past.
 ▪ The factors that encourage return 
have differing relationships with 
time. Missing faraway relatives 
can be a long-term factor in life 
abroad, but is often insufficient to 
prompt return. A sudden family 
crisis at home, however, can trig-
ger return because of the sense of 
urgency. Examples include serious 
illness, fear of family breakdown, 
fear of divorce, or the death of 
a relative caring for young chil-
dren.22, 23, 30, 37, 50
 ▪ Concepts of home and nostalgia 
also figure in return reflections. 
They do not usually feature in 
short-term plans, but nevertheless 
have significance for the ways in 
which migrants manage negotia-
tions of belonging both over time 
and across space.23,33
 ▪ Commonalities in temporal 
dimensions, such as age at migra-
tion, length of stay in the country 
of settlement, and current stage 
in life, can diminish differences 
between countries of origin. For 
instance, Poles and Pakistanis 
with similar migration histories 
were found to have similar notions 
of home and belonging.23, 32, 33
 ▪ Social scientists typically distin-
guish between migrants (the first 
generation) and their children 
born in the country of destina-
tion (the second generation). But 
considerations about return and 
settlement vary along a continu-
um, and the distinction between 
generations is often blurred. 
Memories and attachments to 
country of origin may matter more 
than birthplace.32, 33
 ▪ Many Polish migrants who live 
in Norway with their families 
have completely changed their 
perspective on return migration 
over the course of a few years. A 
typical trajectory was coming to 
test the ground in Norway in 2004, 
relocating family in 2006 and, by 
the time of interview in 2012, see-
ing return migration as a distant 
retirement prospect.22, 28, 29
POLICY POINT Where people come from retains its own unique 
meaning over the life course. Yet, experiences of being a long-time immi-
grant or growing up as a child of immigrant background may have similar-
ities across national origins. Furthermore, particular life stages and transi-
tions can create shared experiences among migrants and non-migrants 
alike. Social arenas that are connected to such stages and transitions there-
fore hold promising prospects for building bridges across national origins.
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 ▪ For migrants who fled political 
oppression, transitional periods 
in the country of origin can evoke 
vexing questions about return. 
The fall of a regime or the intro-
duction of multi-party democracy, 
for example, can suddenly lift 
the impossibility of return that 
has underpinned migrants’ lives 
abroad. Such transitions generate 
new considerations about identi-
ties and attachments.40, 41, 47
 ▪ Considerations about return are 
heavily influenced by life stages 
and transitions not only of the 
migrants, but of their family 
members. For instance, ageing 
parents requiring care back in the 
country of origin can incentivize 
return.33
 ▪ The temporariness of migra-
tion can be sustained for years 
when families are split. This is the 
case for many male Polish labour 
migrants in Norway. They have 
a clear intention to return—they 
want to go back and say they are 
going back—but have no plan for 
making that possible in the short 
term.22, 28
Return migration and aspects of time
Five aspects of time influence considerations about return migration:
• Time since migration: Migrants’ thoughts about return can change as time 
passes. Many labour migrants initially had firm intentions to go back, but 
ended up postponing return indefinitely.
• Age at migration: The meaning of ‘return’ is shaped by migrants’ 
experiences in their country of origin before leaving. For those who 
migrated as children or youth, return would mean a first-time encounter 
with daily life as an adult in the country of origin.  
• Biographical time: Considerations about return are shaped by age and 
life stage, and the corresponding circumstances of close family members. 
Reaching retirement age or seeing children through secondary school, 
for instance, can be major factors for postponing return.
• Bureaucratic time: For many migrants, the issue of return is entangled in 
administrative procedures with their own temporal framework: waiting for 
decisions, launching appeals and facing deadlines for leaving the country. 
• Historical time: Societal changes in the country of origin and the country 
of destination can shape migrants’ attitude towards return migration 
positively or negatively. Such effects can result from decisive historical 
moments or from the perceived direction of social change, in general.
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6. Return migration creates intersections  
of the social and the economic
All migration has both social and economic dimensions, but the intersection of 
the two takes particular forms in the case of return migration. Potential returnees 
usually have first-hand experience from both origin and destination countries and 
face expectations in both places.
 ▪ In some cases, social and economic 
considerations exert opposing 
pressures on decisions to return. 
Most commonly, migrants may 
have to endure the social hardship 
of family separation in order to 
provide economically.22, 23, 37
 ▪ Return ambitions can enhance 
economic integration. Migrants 
save money, send remittances, 
make short-term visits and invest 
in their country of origin all 
as part of their preparation for 
return. These practices require 
income, usually stemming from 
the labour market in the country 
of settlement. Moreover, some mi-
grants pursue education that they 
expect to be valuable upon return.
 ▪ It can seem as though economic 
factors matter more for the initial 
emigration, while social factors 
matter more for the decision to 
return or not. In time, as migrants 
become accustomed to a new social 
model and way of life abroad, there 
is often tension. It arises between 
‘the good state’ abroad—with its 
transparent, democratic institu-
tions—and ‘the good society’ back 
in the country of origin—with its 
strong social relations.50
 ▪ Family and livelihood consider-
ations appeared to play out in 
contrasting ways among both 
Polish and Pakistani migrants. 
In the family sphere, return was 
commonly triggered by crises; in 
the economic sphere, return was 
triggered by emerging opportuni-
ties.10, 22, 28, 30
 ▪ Return visits—which frequent-
ly inform return decisions—are 
points of high social and econom-
ic stakes. Not only is a trip to a 
distant country of origin costly, 
but return visitors are expected to 
spend additional money on bring-
ing gifts, buying items for family 
and friends, and sometimes con-
tributing to expenses for events, 
such as weddings. Meeting these 
economic expectations affects the 
social outcomes of the visit.2, 6, 23, 49
 ▪ The balance between social and 
economic considerations can shift 
over time and across genera-
tions. Pakistani migration to the 
UK has been driven primarily by 
an economic logic, which remains 
prominent in the older genera-
tion’s thoughts about return mi-
gration. The younger generation, 
however, shows a more confident 
capacity to aspire beyond the eco-
nomic and tie migration decisions 
more to lifestyle considerations.5
 ▪ Return migration is both facilitat-
ed and complicated by economic 
growth in the country of origin. 
An oil-fuelled economy in Iraqi 
Kurdistan has provided econom-
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ic opportunities for returnees. 
However, rising prosperity among 
the people who stayed behind has 
also raised the bar for what being 
a successful returnee means.47, 49
 ▪ Corruption in the country of 
origin is an influential factor that 
cuts across social and economic 
spheres. Corruption may stand in 
the way of economic reintegration. 
Moreover, it can produce a feeling 
of social alienation in returnees 
who have become accustomed to 
norms and standards of low-cor-
ruption societies.27, 47, 48
 ▪ Like corruption, education is a 
factor that merges social and eco-
nomic spheres. Education was a 
recurrent motivation for return to 
Pakistan, being for many as much 
about the cultural Pakistani, or 
religious Islamic dimensions, as 
about purely academic objectives. 
In Pakistan and Kurdistan alike, 
possibilities for sending children 
to prestigious private schools also 
encouraged return.30, 50
 ▪ Work-related influences on 
decisions about return migration 
include the basic issues of having 
a job and earning a decent salary. 
But the sphere of work also 
includes important non-economic 
factors. The culture of work, rela-
tions between management and 
staff, and opportunities for career 
development all played central 
roles in Polish labour migrants 
considerations about return.10, 22, 29
 ▪ Analysis of Norwegian survey data 
showed that economic resources 
have no clear effect on return 
intentions. This finding is unsur-
prising since economic resources 
can either strengthen or weaken 
return intentions, depending on 
the circumstances. The absence of 
a general correlation thus coexists 
with important effects for individ-
ual migrants.17
 ▪ The notion of capital conversion 
is valuable for understanding the 
interplay between social and eco-
nomic aspects of return. Migrants 
spend economic capital on trans-
national practices that strengthen 
their social capital. Upon return, 
this capital can be decisive for se-
curing an economic foothold. For 
example, it can determine whether 
returnees succeed in applying 
their skills and savings to the crea-
tion of a viable business.54
Four-way considerations
When people consider migration, the often cited push and pull factors 
are only part of the story. Equally important are what circumstances 
retain migrants, keeping them put in the origin, or repel them from the 
destination. These four sets of factors shape considerations about return 
migration, too. Selected examples from PREMIG case studies provide an 
illustration in the table. The specific factors vary between communities 
and individuals, and can change over time.5, 9, 22, 41, 47
Country of settlement Country of origin
Po
sit
ive
 a
sp
ec
ts Retention factors
• Rule of law
• Employment conditions
• Opportunities for sending 
remittances 
Pull factors
• Relaxed pace of life
• Social relationships
• Availability of potential 
spouses
N
eg
at
ive
 a
sp
ec
ts Push factors
• Anti-immigrant politics
• Lack of discipline for children
• Absence of family networks
Repulsion factors
• Corruption and nepotism
• Social control
• Expectations placed on 
returnees
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7. Gender relations affect return migration  
in contradictory ways
The literature on return migration has found that men, more often than women, 
are inclined to return to their country of origin. The reasons partly have to do with 
gendered notions of status and belonging. Nuances and contradictions, however, 
modify this overarching pattern.
 ▪ Afghans in Norway and the UK 
were often most influenced by 
their mothers in considerations 
about return. Mothers would fre-
quently encourage their sons to re-
main abroad, even if they did not 
want to. In other instances, they 
would encourage sons to return if 
the male head of the household in 
Afghanistan had since died.
 ▪ Asylum seekers may long live with 
an unresolved legal status in the 
country of destination. Young Af-
ghan men in this situation found it 
difficult to foster relationships 
with local women because of the 
threat of involuntary return. Young 
women or their parents assumed 
that any romantic declarations 
were motivated by the men want-
ing to secure a foothold in Europe. 
Moreover, parents anticipated their 
daughter’s suffering if asylum 
were refused to their prospective 
son-in-law and he was returned.
 ▪ Societies of origin perceived to op-
press women sometimes also offer 
women social freedoms that they 
lack in Europe. In the diaspora, 
the women often live without the 
networks and mechanisms that 
provide social opportunities in 
the country of origin. Some of the 
Kurdish interviewees, for instance, 
referred to depressed and isolated 
women in Europe who were overly 
dependent on their husbands and 
not allowed to work. Back in the 
country of origin, they may have 
had greater liberties through social 
networks, to the extent that uncles 
and cousins could vouch for them. 50
 ▪ Elderly migrant women who would 
typically be seen as ‘poorly inte-
grated’ in European societies 
might nevertheless enjoy the free-
doms they would otherwise lack in 
the country of origin. Several Paki-
stani women in Norway who were 
not working and did not speak 
Norwegian very well still saw their 
social freedoms as a significant 
factor discouraging return.9
 ▪ Among Pakistanis—who have 
a long history of migration to 
Norway and the UK—gender 
differences take on particular 
forms when the third generation 
is born. The women who have be-
come grandmothers are usually re-
luctant to return to Pakistan, and 
the grandfathers tend to return on 
their own but only temporarily.
 ▪ The gender implications of return 
migration are intertwined with is-
sues of class and social mobility. 
Men’s desire for social status is 
sometimes seen as a motivation 
for their greater desire to return. 
But women from several coun-
tries of origin also pointed to the 
advantage of social mobility upon 
return, namely in the appealing 
possibility to hire domestic help.
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8. Return visits play a crucial role in  
migration trajectories
Shorter visits to the country of origin play a role that should not be 
underestimated. Such visits are important for making informed decisions about 
return as well as for maintaining transnational ties while living abroad. Return 
visits can become focal points for conflicting experiences of difference and 
attachment.
 ▪ Return visits have a dual effect. 
On the one hand, they can streng-
then emotional ties to the country 
of origin, while, on the other hand, 
dampen the appeal of return. For 
migrants who have lived abroad 
with the dream of returning to 
the homeland, visits serve as a 
reality check. Frustrations with 
corruption, governance failures, 
and power outages, for instance, 
can be disheartening reminders of 
what they left behind.1, 23
 ▪ Many migrants communicate 
closely with people in the 
country of origin and regularly 
engage in its online media. Even 
so, the experience of being back 
can be full of surprises and differ 
from expectations, positively 
or negatively. There is a clear, 
commonly acknowledged value in 
‘seeing it for yourself’ rather than 
relying on others’ accounts and 
impressions.50
 ▪ In migrant communities with a 
large second generation, trips 
to the parents’ country of origin 
occupy a unique place in the 
lives of children of immigrants. 
Among second- and third-genera-
tion British Pakistanis, such visits 
were important because of their 
frequency, their resilience to go be-
yond the first generation and the 
economic commitment involved.3, 6
 ▪ Return visits are important not 
only for the very migrants who 
travel and their family and friends 
in the country of origin, but 
also for others in the diaspora. 
Within migrant communities 
in Europe, those who visit their 
country of origin often bring gifts 
or remittances on behalf of others 
and then return with updated in-
for mation and impressions. Such 
indirect insights contribute to re-
flections and debates about return 
within the diaspora community.40, 53
 ▪ The return visits of emigrants 
who live in Europe also fuel 
migration aspirations in the 
country of origin. Together with 
their remittances and resources 
to build new houses, the visits 
feed into local imaginations of 
Europe.47
 ▪ In societies of origin where cor-
ruption is endemic and informal 
networks determine success, re-
turnees depend on ‘friends in high 
places’. Without such connections, 
it can be difficult to secure a job or 
develop a business. Return visits 
in the years preceding return play 
a key role in maintaining social 
visibility and cultivating relation-
ships with influential individuals. 
Moreover, visits serve to preserve 
good relations with family and 
friends, who frequently have su-
perior social capital that migrants 
may tap into upon return.50, 54
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 ▪ Migrants’ return visits can be a 
mixed experience for family in 
the country of origin who host 
the visitors. There are many pos-
itive aspects. For example, niec-
es, nephews and other children 
regularly get a lot of attention and 
gifts from their returning family 
members. But there are also prac-
tical difficulties. In Afghanistan, 
families sometimes struggled to 
provide space for returnee visitors 
who had grown accustomed to 
European standards of privacy. 
Moreover, there were challenges 
related to visitors getting ill from 
the food, the water, and dust.
The seven connections 
between return visits and 
return migration
Across the various case stud-
ies, we found that shorter visits 
to the country of origin offered 
seven functions that all relate to 
return but produce disparate 
outcomes. 
• Return visits provide first-
hand information for making 
decisions about return.
•  Return visits enable invest-
ment in social capital that can 
underpin successful return.
•  Return visits offer inspiration 
for business development.
•  Return visits facilitate 
practical preparations, such as 
construction of a house.
•  Return visits remind migrants 
that the realities of return 
might be intolerable. 
•  Return visits sustain 
transnational ties when return 
is not feasible or desirable.
•  Return visits maintain the 
myth of return as a vague 
future possibility.
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9. Return experiences are shaped by  
more than tangible outcomes
Just as considerations about return are multi-faceted, so too are return experiences. 
The circumstances of return affect not only the tangible outcomes for individuals, 
but also whether they see the glass as half-empty or half-full. Making sense of 
one’s own experience is a process in its own right.
 ▪ Returnees simultaneously enter 
different contexts, or levels, 
of reintegration: the family, the 
community, the society, the state. 
Processes of reintegration differ 
across these levels, and the overall 
experience thus depends on where 
one choses to focus.43
 ▪ In the Polish case, ‘returnees’ 
often did not identify as return 
migrants at all. This was because 
they did not perceive their mi-
gration as ‘migration’ in the first 
place. They had worked abroad, 
thus spending some time away, 
but they did not identify as mi-
grants. Many Pakistani returnees 
also did not consider themselves 
as returnees, albeit for a different 
reason: they saw themselves as 
living transnationally, with the 
option of going back to Europe, 
not having returned to Pakistan 
for good.10, 27, 28, 30
 ▪ Migrants, like other people, tend to 
form narratives about their own 
choices that can be reconciled 
with their everyday existence and 
broader life projects. Returnees 
might therefore present similar 
challenges differently depending 
on, for instance, whether their 
return was wanted or unwanted. 
Accounts of return experiences 
are likely to change over time and 
depend on returnees’ future plans, 
desires and opportunities.22, 36, 42, 49, 56
 ▪ Migrants’ legal status abroad 
shapes not only considerations 
about return, but its actual expe-
riences, too. Returnees who had 
the option of going back to Europe 
were more likely to present their 
return as a positive, enjoyable ex-
perience, even in very challenging 
settings. While deportees experi-
enced shame, European passport 
holders viewed their return with 
pride.43, 49, 57
POLICY POINT Rejected asy-
lum seekers often resist the legal 
obligation to return. Consequently, 
European policymakers tasked 
with migration management have 
turned to programmes of assist-
ed return and reintegration. Such 
programmes are seen as less 
politically costly, more humane, 
simpler, and cheaper than depor-
tation. But with very limited mon-
itoring and evaluation, we have in-
sufficient information about how 
well the programmes work and 
whether returnees are given the 
promised assistance. Compre-
hensive evaluations of such poli-
cies are costly, but for the sake of 
formulating evidence-based poli-
cy, key questions could be singled 
out for special attention.42, 46
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10. Reintegration can be as challenging  
as integration
It can be enlightening to compare reintegration after return with integration after 
the initial migration. On the one hand, reintegration seems more straightforward 
since an individual is re-entering an apparently familiar social environment. On 
the other hand, expectations, suspicions and invisible differences may loom large.
 ▪ Returnees typically face great 
expectations from people in their 
community of origin and risk be-
ing regarded as failures. Worst 
of all is being deported, as some 
interpret that as a sign of having 
done something criminal (beyond 
illegal residence) in the country 
of destination. Migrants who have 
the ability to choose sometimes 
feel they cannot return because 
the pressure to prove successful is 
too strong.37, 49, 56
 ▪ While migrants on return visits 
typically come bearing gifts, those 
who return against their will often 
are empty-handed and are a po-
tential burden on their families. 
They need accommodation and 
food, and it can take a long time 
before they are able to start con-
tributing to the household budget. 
If the migrant was working abroad 
and sending remittances, their 
untimely return also represents an 
income loss for the family.22, 28, 37, 42
 ▪ In some countries of origin, re-
turnees face particular dangers. 
Because they are assumed to have 
money, they risk being targeted for 
extortion. Moreover, in the Afghan 
case, some originally left because 
of blood feuds and are vulnerable 
to reprisal attacks. Assumptions 
that returnees had become ‘West-
ernized’ or ‘anti-Islamic’ could also 
endanger their security.42, 44
 ▪ Some return migrants are moti-
vated by a desire to help develop 
their homeland, especially in 
post-conflict situations. That said, 
experiences of corruption, nepo-
tism and sometimes kleptocracy 
can alienate idealistic returnees 
and undermine the sense of patri-
otism that spurred their return in 
the first place.50
 ▪ A key obstacle to reintegration in 
Afghanistan—apart from obvious 
challenges such as security threats 
and unemployment—was that 
many returnees were not focusing 
POLICY POINT Return and reintegration programmes prioritize 
return over reintegration. The term ‘reintegration’ thus risks becoming a 
rhetorical device that serves to justify the return of migrants to societies 
in turmoil and allows development funding to be used for migration man-
agement. Most reintegration assistance for returnees from Europe is short-
term, fails to strengthen returnees’ social capital, and is rarely subjected to 
longer-term monitoring.42, 43, 46 
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their attention to reintegration. 
First, their gaze was directed 
towards Europe and the possibil-
ity of leaving Afghanistan again. 
Second, they were focused on just 
staying safe, leaving little capacity 
to be proactive in reintegrating 
beyond the family.42 
 ▪ Social pressures on returnees 
tend to be greater in rural areas. 
The performance of migration-re-
lated success is more visible in 
smaller communities; migrants 
build prominent houses, make 
philanthropic contributions, and 
are major local investors. The 
more transparent village life is, the 
more evident the failure to meet 
expectations. 
 ▪ Returnees can affect local com-
munities and economies in ways 
not welcome by all. Attitudes to-
wards returnees differ between 
those who stand to gain—say, 
through employment—and those 
who stand to lose—through com-
petition from returnee businesses 
or employees with superior quali-
fications, for example.
 ▪ Many returnees re-enter societies 
where emigration is a common 
desire and successful migrants 
garner prominence through their 
visits, houses or investments. 
Returning prematurely and emp-
ty-handed then easily gives rise to 
suspicions and gossip about how 
the migrant wasted the opportuni-
ty abroad.19, 49, 54, 57
 ▪ Returnees are sometimes faced 
with the challenge of rebuilding 
social networks and earning the 
trust of others. Lack of trust can 
be a key obstacle in the reinte-
gration process. Not only has the 
social landscape usually under-
gone considerable changes since 
the migrant departed, but migra-
tion itself has changed the power 
dynamics of relationships.25, 48, 54
POLICY POINT ‘Sustainable return’ is an established, by now influen-
tial term in policy circles. In practice, its effect is narrower than the word 
‘sustainable’ implies: the return is sustained in the sense that returnees re-
main in place. When this is the outcome, it may have more to do with 
returnees’ deprivation, which leaves them with no other option, than with 
social or economic sustainability.43, 46
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Unforeseen themes
Child welfare services
Lack of trust in government insti-
tutions was a recurrent theme in 
emigration, immigration and return 
settings across the case studies. 
Among Polish immigrants in Norway, 
particularly great concerns emerged 
around child welfare services.35 Fears 
of children being taken from their 
parents were reflected in extensive 
media coverage in Poland. Polish 
television viewers have followed a pri-
vate detective who removes children 
from the custody of the child welfare 
service in Norway and takes them to 
Poland. Several Polish newspapers 
have featured interviews with Nor-
wegian defence counsel and parents 
involved in child welfare proceedings. 
The unforeseen salience of this issue 
points to the particular complications 
of ensuring children’s welfare in a 
transnational setting. It also epito-
mizes more general issues relating to 
trust in government institutions and 
its impact of return considerations.
POLICY POINT Norway’s child welfare services have been hard-
pressed to gain trust among immigrant populations. While the organiza-
tion has put in place trust-building measures and is seeking to address the 
problem, migrants’ scepticism is symptomatic of more widespread distrust 
in the Norwegian state’s ability to cater to their best interests. Even if such 
distrust is not founded in discriminatory practices, it is in itself a sign of 
failing communication.
Scientific work sometimes takes unexpected turns. Our 
research on return migration led to several original 
observations that we were able to explore further despite their 
going beyond the initial plan.
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Corruption
In the case study on Iraqi Kurdistan, 
corruption emerged as a major con-
cern for migrants who contemplated 
return as well as for those who had 
returned. Widespread corruption not 
only obstructs economic reintegration, 
but also alienates returnees from the 
Kurdish nation-building project, 
under mines a sense of belonging, and 
creates an insecure environment.48 
Connections between migration and 
corruption turned out to be prevalent 
elsewhere too.25 They are often men-
tioned in passing in the literature on 
migration, but research that exami nes 
such connections in-depth remains 
embryonic. Since most migration to 
countries with higher income levels is 
also migration to countries with lower 
corruption levels, it is important to 
incorporate corruption into the study 
of return and reintegration. As a foun-
dation for an emergent research field, 
we sought to map how migration and 
corruption are connected.16 
Rumour
Our research among Burundians in 
Norway and the UK revealed how, in 
the absence of verifiable information, 
rumour had a tremendous impact on 
considerations about return. Unsur-
prisingly, there were rumours about 
future developments in Burundi’s 
fragile political field—especially sur-
rounding the likelihood of a coup d’état 
that could dramatically alter conditions 
for return. But rumours also flourished 
around the ‘true’ functioning of the 
asylum system. As with corruption, we 
found that rumour is an influential, 
albeit understudied, aspect of migration 
dynamics across different contexts. The 
migration literature often mentions 
how migrants relate to various ru-
mours, but the mechanisms at work 
are rarely examined in-depth. This 
observation inspired us to draw from 
research on rumour in social psychol-
ogy and other disciplines and develop 
a foundation for studying the role ru-
mour plays in migration processes.19
Ten links between migration and corruption16
•  Corruption facilitates illegal migration.
•  Corruption enables humanitarian protection.
•  Corruption impedes the development benefits of migration.
•  Corruption stimulates migration desires.
•  Corruption promotes the transnational ties of elites.
•  Corruption discourages return migration.
•  Social remittances reduce corruption.
•  Migration upends corrupt social structures.
•  Migration sustains corruption.
•  Corruption undermines assistance to migrants.
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Research communication
PREMIG Update newsletter
Our quarterly project newsletter 
provided a regular channel for us to 
communicate with an international 
audience of academics, practitioners, 
collaborators, and others. PREMIG 
Update contained news about project 
activities and events, and as the 
research progressed, announced 
new publications. In addition, team 
members wrote brief research 
reflections on various aspects of their 
work within the project.
What makes for a successful newsletter? 
Our experiences with PREMIG Update taught us lessons to carry into the 
future as well as some unresolved dilemmas.
• Specific groups of recipients—policymakers, research participants, 
activists, journalists, students—can have diverging interests and 
perspectives, none of which are perfectly matched by a general-
purpose newsletter.
• Committing to a regular publication schedule is good for consistency in 
communication. However, the nature and volume of news varies over a 
project’s lifespan.
• A web-based newsletter platform, such as MailChimp, which we used, 
provides opportunities to map and understand our audience and what 
is catching attention. We could make better use of such knowledge to 
further improve research communication.
• Text and images, layout and formatting, headings and photo captions all 
come together to determine how effectively the newsletter communicates.
• Producing a newsletter is contingent on team efforts as well as a com-
mitted editor. Following through, systematically, on a commitment to 
regularly produce a quality newsletter demands substantial time and 
resources.
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PRIO Policy Briefs
Policy briefs within the PRIO Policy 
Briefs series have been an essential 
complement to academic publica-
tions. These briefs do not necessarily 
make policy recommendations, but 
present research-based insights to 
make our findings more accessible 
and relevant to policymakers and 
practitioners. We solicited valuable 
advice from the project’s advisory 
board on how to make the most of 
the policy brief format, based on a 
participatory evaluation exercise. The 
feedback was implemented in our 
policy briefs beyond the PREMIG 
project. (Policy briefs that draw on 
PREMIG research are included on 
our list of publications.)
Research reflections published in PREMIG Update
• Where is my home? by Marta Bivand Erdal, 2014/4
• Iraqi Kurdistan: From out of sight to the media limelight by Erlend Paasche, 
2014/3
• Capturing dynamic life experiences by Rojan Ezzati, 2014/3
• The unintended consequences of education among Pakistani migrants to the 
UK by Marta Bolognani, 2014/2
• Complexities and challenges in Afghan migration by Ceri Oeppen, 2013/2
•  ‘Maybe someday I ’ll return…’ by Rojan Ezzati, 2013/2
•  Trust matters by Tove Heggli Sagmo, 2013/1
•  Politics of labelling (in) a semi-independent state by Erlend Paasche, 2013/1
•  Return intentions by Silje Vatne Pettersen, 2012/4
•  Approaches to activism in policy-relevant research by Ceri Oeppen, 2012/4
•  Ambivalence with regard to returnees by Marta Bolognani, 2012/3
• ‘Labour migration’: What’s in a label? by Marta Bivand Erdal, 2012/3
• Communicating through policy briefs by Jørgen Carling, 2012/2
• Working with focus groups by Marta Bivand Erdal, 2012/2
• Fieldwork and security by Tove Heggli Sagmo, 2012/1
•  How to define the ‘super-diverse’? by Rojan Ezzati, 2012/1
• Why are visits to the country of origin so important? by Marta Bolognani, 2011/3
•  The EU Returns Directive by Ceri Oeppen, 2011/3
•  Organizing a collaborative literature review by Jennifer Wu, 2011/2
• Voluntary return and reintegration programmes: ‘volition’ and ‘sustainability’ 
by Erlend Paasche, 2011/2
•  Is ‘return migration’ a meaningful concept? by Jørgen Carling, 2011/1
36
Seminars and workshops
We engaged with various user groups 
in workshops and seminars through-
out the project. Breakfast seminars at 
PRIO attracted migrants from our 
case study groups, fellow researchers, 
students, journalists, diplomats and 
other practitioners. We also brought 
insights from the project directly to 
policymakers through other events.
Training Afghan officials  
on return migration
In 2013, Ceri Oeppen was asked 
by the Geneva Centre for Secu-
rity Policy to give a training work-
shop on migration for Afghan 
government officials. She shared 
preliminary findings about how 
our Afghan research participants 
had experienced return and the 
reintegration challenges they had 
faced. It was a fascinating op-
portunity to gauge reactions to 
PREMIG findings and to discuss 
how people in Afghanistan felt 
about the Afghan diaspora. Al-
most all the officials had been 
refugees at some point in their 
lives, and most had relatives still 
living abroad in the wider diaspo-
ra. They expressed disapproval of 
those who had left Afghanistan, 
claiming asylum, but not returned; 
they felt such individuals were an 
embarrassment to the post-Tali-
ban government.
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Return migration and transnationalism
The relationship between return migration and mi-
grants’ transnational ties was a core PREMIG theme. 
In 2012, we organized an international workshop at 
which 19 research papers were presented around this 
connection. Over the following year, we worked with 
a group of the authors to develop a special section 
of the journal International Migration 52(6), 2014, guest 
edited by Jørgen Carling and Marta Bivand Erdal. Like 
the project itself, the articles spanned over divides be-
tween different forms of migration.
In the introductory article, we argued that there is of-
ten a blurred boundary between mobility as a trans-
national practice, for instance in the form of return 
visits, and purportedly permanent or long-term return 
migration. We also explored how migration trajecto-
ries, involving various forms of ‘return’ moves, create 
different forms of transnationalism. Examples include 
the ‘reverse transnational’ practices of returnees and 
the ‘residual transnationalism’ of migrants who, after an 
unsuccessful return experience, decide to settle per-
manently abroad.35
• ‘Return migration and transnationalism: How are 
the two connected?’ by Jørgen Carling and Marta 
Bivand Erdal
• ‘Return migration intentions in the integration–
transnationalism matrix’ by Jørgen Carling and Silje 
Vatne Pettersen
• ‘The emergence of lifestyle reasoning in return 
considerations among British Pakistanis’ by Marta 
Bolognani
• ‘Post-return transnationalism and the Iraqi 
displacement in Syria and Jordan’ by Vanessa Iaria
• ‘Split return: Transnational household strategies in 
Afghan repatriation’ by Kristian Berg Harpviken
• ‘Double return migration: Failed returns to Poland 
leading to settlement abroad and new transnational 
strategies’ by Anne White
• ‘Second-generation “return” to Greece: New 
dynamics of transnationalism and integration’ by 
Russell King and Anastasia Christou
• ‘The rise and fall of diasporic bonds in Japanese-
Peruvian “return” migration’ by Ayumi Takenaka
37
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Conferences
The PREMIG project began with an 
opening conference in August 2011 
entitled ‘Dream threat duty: The 
many faces of return migration’. The 
following year, we hosted a confer-
ence specifically on the connections 
between return migration and trans-
nationalism. The closing conference 
came in August 2015, under the 
title ‘Thinking about going “home”: 
Engaging with scenarios of return 
migration.’ In addition to drawing 
conclusions from PREMIG research, 
the conference convened academics 
from a dozen countries who present-
ed papers on how migrants relate to 
the possibility of a future return. 
The media
Mass media played an important role 
in communicating about the project. 
At times, we took the initiative to 
disseminate findings, for instance 
through writing op-eds. In other in-
stances, we enged in current debates 
or provided commentary to events in 
the news. Insights from the project 
helped us contribute expertise on 
topics related to PREMIG research as 
well as regional expertise on the coun-
tries that our case studies covered.
Navigating languages
PREMIG is an international research project hosted at a research institute with 
English as its working language. However, many of our audiences have another 
preferred language. Further, the project is funded by a research programme 
that seeks to strengthen policy-relevant knowledge in Norway. Some of our 
policy briefs are therefore published in Norwegian versions alongside the Eng-
lish. While most of our academic publications are in English, the project also 
produced an article in the leading Polish scientific journal in migration studies, 
Studia Migracyjne – Przegląd Polonijny.
Analysing conflict in Kurdistan
Research on return migration can pro-
duce in-depth country knowledge. 
Drawing on PREMIG interviews with 
over 100 Iraqi Kurdish migrants and 
retur nees, Erlend Paasche provided 
commentary to Norwegian and inter-
national media on the state of affairs in 
Iraqi Kurdistan during attacks by the ex-
tremist group that calls itself the Islamic 
State. 
Debating dual citizenship
Marta Bivand Erdal and Tove Heggli Sag-
mo drew on their PREMIG research to 
enter the public debate on citizenship 
legislation in Norway. Unlike its Nordic 
neighbours, Norway does not permit 
dual citizenship, and the scholars wrote 
two op-eds advocating for a change in 
this policy. One op-ed led to a tele vised 
debate with political leaders. 
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Research communication and social media
Developing good practices for research commu-
nication is a continuous learning experience. Not 
only is there a lot to learn, but rapid changes in 
the social media landscape, technical solutions, 
and the research environment all required a will-
ingness to adapt. 
Halfway through PREMIG’s lifespan, PRIO launched 
a blog (prio.org/blogs) to which the project con-
tributed a number of posts. They included trans-
lations of opinion pieces that were originally pub-
lished in Norwegian mass media, thus fulfilling 
greater aims to reach a broader audience. 
The range of possible online identities also pre-
sents dilemmas. What is the best way to com-
bine the online presence of institutions, research 
groups, projects, and individual researchers? This 
is one of the questions we take with us as we 
develop new projects.
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Project team
Jørgen Carling (Research 
Professor at PRIO, PhD in 
human geography) is the 
PREMIG project leader and 
has overseen the research. 
Apart from leadership and 
coordination, his work 
within the project concen-
trated on the analysis of re-
turn migration intentions. 
Alongside the conclusion 
of PREMIG, he now leads a 
new project called Trans-
national Lives in the Welfare 
State (TRANSWEL), which 
examines the experiences 
of people who simultane-
ously lead their lives in two 
countries.
Marta Bolognani  
(Research Associate at the 
University of Bristol, PhD 
in sociology) carried out re-
search in the project’s Paki-
stani case study, including 
fieldwork in Pakistan and 
the UK. She was recruited 
into the project with exten-
sive research experience 
on British Pakistanis and, 
more generally, on Islam 
in Europe. Following her 
PREMIG work, she joined 
a project team researching 
marriage migration and 
integration in the UK.
Marta Bivand Erdal  
(Senior Researcher at 
PRIO, PhD in human ge-
ography) led the work pack-
age ‘Experiences of return’, 
including coordination of 
data collection in countries 
of origin. Her research 
within PREMIG concen-
trated on the Pakistani and 
the Polish case studies. She 
currently leads two new 
projects: Negotiating the  
Nation: Implications of ethnic 
and religious diversity for 
national identity (NATION) 
and Governing and Ex-
periencing Citizenship in 
Multicultural Scandinavia 
(GOVCIT).
Rojan Tordhol Ezzati 
(Researcher at PRIO, PhD 
candidate in sociology) led 
the work package ‘Possibil-
ities of return’, including 
coordination of fieldwork 
in Norway and the UK. 
Her own research within 
the project concentrated 
on the super-diversity case 
study in Norway, which 
endeavoured to transcend 
the traditional focus on na-
tional origins in migration 
research. She is current-
ly conducting doctoral 
research within the project 
Negotiating Values: Collective 
Identities and Resilience after 
22/7 (NECORE).
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Ceri Oeppen (Lecturer 
in Human Geography at 
the University of Sussex, 
PhD in migration studies) 
carried out the Afghan case 
study within PREMIG, 
including fieldwork in Af-
ghanistan, Norway and the 
UK. She joined the project 
with previous research 
experience among Afghan 
Americans in the United 
States and Afghanistan. 
She is a member of the In-
dependent Advisory Group 
on Country Information, 
which works to quality-as-
sure the country of origin 
information used in UK 
immigration procedures.
Erlend Paasche (Resear-
cher at PRIO, PhD candi-
date in sociology) conduct-
ed research towards a PhD 
within PREMIG. He car-
ried out the Iraqi Kurdish 
case study and conducted 
fieldwork in Norway, the 
UK and Iraqi Kurdistan. 
Before joining the project, 
he did research on Iraqi ref-
ugees in Syria. Alongside 
doctoral research within 
PREMIG, he has been 
engaged in several evalu-
ations of assisted return 
and reintegration, covering 
Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Iraq, 
Kosovo, and Nigeria.
Silje Vatne Pettersen 
(Senior Adviser at Statistics 
Norway, MA in demogra-
phy) led the work package 
‘Patterns of return’, which 
is based on analysis of 
Norwegian register data 
on population movements. 
She also worked on the 
analysis of return migra-
tion intentions. Alongside 
her PREMIG work, she 
serves as coordinator of 
migration-related statistics 
and analysis at Statistics 
Norway and conducts re-
search on emigration from 
Norway and on acquisitions 
of Norwegian citizenship.
Tove Heggli Sagmo 
(Researcher at PRIO, 
PhD candidate in human 
geography) conducted 
research towards a PhD 
within PREMIG. She 
carried out the Burundian 
case study and conducted 
fieldwork in Norway, the 
UK and Burundi. She was 
recruited to the project with 
background experience 
from the United Nations 
High Commissioner for 
Refugees. After completing 
her PREMIG work, she 
undertook new research on 
the relationship between 
citizenship and integration 
in Scandinavia.
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Collaborators
Besides the core group of researchers, 
the following individuals made sub-
stantial contributions to the research:
• Shawkat Abdullah
• Anum Amjad
• Justyna Bell
• Qamar Zaman Bodla
• Grant Ennis
• Refik Gefur
• Zaheer Khan
• Vejin Jaffer
• Ali Kurdistani
• Aleksandra Lewicki
• Nassim Majidi
• Elin Berstad Mortensen
• Shaima Noor
• Baseer Omaid
• Jasmin Osman
• Maria Piechowska
• Justyna Pokojska
• Asma Rubab
• Amina Shadab
• Cathrine Talleraas
• Fatma Wakil
• Jennifer Wu
• Ajmal Attak Yousafzay
Institutional partnerships 
The PREMIG project benefited from 
institutional partnerships under the 
auspices of key individuals, as follows:
• Centre for the Study of Ethnicity 
and Citizenship, University of 
Bristol: Paul Statham
• Centre of Migration Research, 
University of Warsaw: Marek 
Okólski and Paweł Kaczmarczyk
• Department of Anthropology, 
Quaid-i-Azam University, 
Islamabad: Hafeez ur Rehman
• Department of Social Statistics, 
Statistics Norway: Elisabeth Nørgaard
• International Relations Office, Uni-
versity of Dohuk: Dawood Atrushi
• Oslo Office, International 
Organization for Migration: 
Antonio Polosa
• School of Global Studies, University 
of Sussex: Richard Black
• School of Oriental and African 
Studies, University of London: 
Laura Hammond
Advisory board 
The PREMIG advisory board met 
every six months and provided an 
arena for discussing and reflecting on 
the research in progress. Members 
were recruited from outside academia 
and contributed with diverse personal 
and professional experiences. The 
following individuals were members 
of the advisory board for shorter or 
longer periods during the project:
• Karin Afeef
• Bente Scott Amundsen
• Chro Borhan
• Valéry Buzungu
• Norunn Grande
• André Johansen
• Julian Kramer
• Margareta Tumidajewich Hauge
• Eva Haagensen
• Mujtaba Mastoor
• Johan Kristian Meyer
• Stine Münter
• Ghazala Naseem
• Sylo Taraku
• Espen Thorud
• Chalank Yahya
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What does it take for an advisory board to work well?
It has become the norm for large research projects to have an advisory board including policymakers or repre-
sentatives of other potential user groups. Deciding to have one is easy; making it a useful and rewarding setup for 
everyone involved is less straightforward. We used the PREMIG experience to identify the following observations 
to implement in future work with advisory boards:
• Advisory board members should be approached 
as individuals with multifaceted personal and 
professional experience, not simply as representatives 
of organizations or particular perspectives.
• The interaction between researchers and advisory 
board can benefit from excluding other researchers 
as advisory board members.
• Work with the advisory board can benefit from 
having one member of the research team dedicated 
to communicating with the board.
• Researchers should identify specific concrete needs 
for input from advisory board members; these needs 
should concern choices the team must make.
• Maintaining an advisory board requires a substantial 
investment of time by researchers and board 
members; careful planning is needed to make the 
investment pay off for everyone.
• The sequence of planning by researchers, input 
from the board and impact on research should be 
monitored and reported back to the advisory board.
• Advisory board meetings can successfully be divided 
between presentations by researchers, work in 
breakout groups and plenary discussion.
• A relatively small advisory board is generally effective, 
but more members might be needed to ensure 
continuity in light of scheduling conflicts and member 
loss due to relocations or job changes.
• Advisory board members cannot be expected 
to remember all the details of the project plan 
and schedule; researchers should help provide an 
overview at regular intervals.
• Meetings should be something board members can 
look forward to. Key factors are learning something 
interesting, feeling useful, and sharing meals together 
in a friendly environment.
• Advisory board members can be approached 
individually or in smaller groups, based on their 
interest and expertise; interaction does not have to 
be limited to the meetings.
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2 Bell, Justyna and Marta 
Bivand Erdal (In press) 
‘Limited but Enduring 
Transnational Ties? 
Transnational Family Life 
among Polish Migrants 
in Norway.’ Studia 
Migracyjne – Przegląd 
Polonijny.
3 Bolognani, Marta (2013) 
‘Changing Perceptions 
about Home: The Life 
of Second and Third 
Generation.’ in Anwar, 
M. (ed.) Potential and 
Prospects of Pakistani 
Diaspora. Islamabad: 
Islamabad Policy 
Research Institute, 17-34.
Publications
These are publications that are based on research 
within the project. As this report goes to press, they are 
in various stages of completion; about half have been 
published and the remainder fall into three categories: 
In preparation: has been drafted and is undergoing 
revisions. 
Under review: has been submitted to the publisher and 
is being evaluated; 
In press: has been accepted for publication and is being 
prepared by the publisher; 
Some of the publications draw upon insights from 
several projects. Those in which PREMIG research plays 
a minor role are marked with an asterisk (*). 
Publications that are freely available online are marked 
with an Open Access logo and accompanied by a direct 
link to the full-text document.
Titles of articles that have not yet been published may 
change in the course of the review and publication 
process. Updated information about final publications 
can be found at www.prio.org/premig. 
1 Abdin, Zain Ul and Marta 
Bivand Erdal (In press) 
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This report presnts insights from 
the research project Possibilities 
and Realities of Return Migration 
(PREMIG), funded by the 
Research Council of Norway 
and led by the Peace Research 
Institute Oslo (PRIO). Over a 
five-year period, a core group of 
eight researchers in Norway and 
the United Kingdom studied 
return migration from multiple 
perspectives. They drew upon 
statistical analyses and face-to-
face interaction with more than 
five hundered migrants and 
returnees in seven countries.
 ▪ How do migrants think about the 
possibility of returning to their 
country of origin?
 ▪ Why are short return visits so 
important for migrants’ lives and 
migration trajectories?
 ▪ Why is it often so difficult to 
reintegrate in the society of origin 
after return?   
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